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The work cited by the Nobel committee was done jointly with the late Amos
Tversky (1937–1996) during a long and unusually close collaboration.
Together, we explored the psychology of intuitive beliefs and choices and ex-
amined their bounded rationality. This essay presents a current perspective
on the three major topics of our joint work: heuristics of judgment, risky
choice, and framing effects. In all three domains we studied intuitions –
thoughts and preferences that come to mind quickly and without much re-
ﬂection. I review the older research and some recent developments in light of
two ideas that have become central to social-cognitive psychology in the in-
tervening decades: the notion that thoughts differ in a dimension of accessi-
bility – some come to mind much more easily than others – and the distinc-
tion between intuitive and deliberate thought processes.
Section 1 distinguishes two generic modes of cognitive function: an intui-
tive mode in which judgments and decisions are made automatically and
rapidly, and a controlled mode, which is deliberate and slower. Section 2 de-
scribes the factors that determine the relative accessibility of different judg-
ments and responses. Section 3 explains framing effects in terms of differen-
tial salience and accessibility. Section 4 relates prospect theory to the general
* This essay revisits problems that Amos Tversky and I studied together many years ago, and con-
tinued to discuss in a conversation that spanned several decades. The article is based on the
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pear in the American Economic Review (December 2003).proposition that changes and differences are more accessible than absolute
values. Section 5 reviews an attribute substitution model of heuristic judg-
ment. Section 6 describes a particular family of heuristics, called prototype
heuristics. Section 7 concludes with a review of the argument.
1. INTUITION AND ACCESSIBILITY
From its earliest days, the research that Tversky and I conducted was guided
by the idea that intuitive judgments occupy a position – perhaps correspond-
ing to evolutionary history – between the automatic operations of perception
and the deliberate operations of reasoning. Our ﬁrst joint article examined
systematic errors in the casual statistical judgments of statistically sophisticat-
ed researchers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). Remarkably, the intuitive judg-
ments of these experts did not conform to statistical principles with which
they were thoroughly familiar. In particular, their intuitive statistical infer-
ences and their estimates of statistical power showed a striking lack of sensi-
tivity to the effects of sample size. We were impressed by the persistence of dis-
crepancies between statistical intuition and statistical knowledge, which we
observed both in ourselves and in our colleagues. We were also impressed by
the fact that signiﬁcant research decisions, such as the choice of sample size
for an experiment, are routinely guided by the ﬂawed intuitions of people
who know better. In the terminology that became accepted much later, we
held a two-system view, which distinguished intuition from reasoning. Our re-
search focused on errors of intuition, which we studied both for their intrin-
sic interest and for their value as diagnostic indicators of cognitive mecha-
nisms.
The two-system view
The distinction between intuition and reasoning has been a topic of consid-
erable interest in the intervening decades (among many others, see Epstein,
1994; Hammond, 1996; Jacoby, 1981, 1996; and numerous models collected
by Chaiken & Trope, 1999; for comprehensive reviews of intuition, see
Hogarth, 2002; Myers, 2002). In particular, the differences between the two
modes of thought have been invoked in attempts to organize seemingly con-
tradictory results in studies of judgment under uncertainty (Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002; Sloman, 1996, 2002; Stanovich, 1999; Stanovich & West,
2002). There is considerable agreement on the characteristics that distin-
guish the two types of cognitive processes, which Stanovich and West (2000)
labeled System 1 and System 2. The scheme shown in Figure 1 summarizes
these characteristics: The operations of System 1 are fast, automatic, effort-
less, associative, and difﬁcult to control or modify. The operations of System
2 are slower, serial, effortful, and deliberately controlled; they are also rela-
tively ﬂexible and potentially rule-governed. As indicated in Figure 1, the op-
erating characteristics of System 1 are similar to the features of perceptual
processes. On the other hand, as Figure 1 also shows, the operations of
System 1, like those of System 2, are not restricted to the processing of cur-
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rent stimulation. Intuitive judgments deal with concepts as well as with per-
cepts, and can be evoked by language.
In the model that will be presented here, the perceptual system and the in-
tuitive operations of System 1 generate impressions of the attributes of objects
of perception and thought. These impressions are not voluntary and need
not be verbally explicit. In contrast, judgments are always explicit and inten-
tional, whether or not they are overtly expressed. Thus, System 2 is involved
in all judgments, whether they originate in impressions or in deliberate rea-
soning. The label ‘intuitive’ is applied to judgments that directly reﬂect im-
pressions. As in several other dual-process models, one of the functions of
System 2 is to monitor the quality of both mental operations and overt be-
havior (Gilbert, 2002; Stanovich & West, 2002). In the anthropomorphic
terms that will be used here, the explicit judgments that people make
(whether overt or not) are endorsed, at least passively, by System 2.
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) suggested that the monitoring is normally
quite lax, and allows many intuitive judgments to be expressed, including
some that are erroneous.
Shane Frederick (personal communication, April 2003) has used simple
puzzles to study cognitive self-monitoring, as in the following example: “A bat
and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much
does the ball cost?” Almost everyone reports an initial tendency to answer “10
cents” because the sum $1.10 separates naturally into $1 and 10 cents, and 10
cents is about the right magnitude. Frederick found that many intelligent
people yield to this immediate impulse: 50% (47/93) of Princeton students,
and 56% (164/293) of students at the University of Michigan gave the wrong
answer. Clearly, these respondents offered a response without checking it.
The surprisingly high rate of errors in this easy problem illustrates how light-
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tomed to thinking hard, and are often content to trust a plausible judgment
that quickly comes to mind. Remarkably, errors in this puzzle and in others of
the same type were signiﬁcant predictors of relative indifference to delayed
rewards (high discount rates), and of cheating.
The accessibility dimension
The core concept of the present analysis of intuitive judgments and prefer-
ences is accessibility – the ease with which particular mental contents come to
mind (Higgins, 1996). A deﬁning property of intuitive thoughts is that they
come to mind spontaneously, like percepts. To understand intuition, then, we
must understand why some thoughts are accessible and others are not. The
concept of accessibility is applied more broadly in this treatment than in com-
mon usage. Category labels, descriptive dimensions (attributes, traits), values
of dimensions, all can be described as more or less accessible, for a given in-
dividual exposed to a given situation at a particular moment. 
For an illustration of differential accessibility, consider Figures 2a and 2b.
As we look at the object in Figure 2a, we have immediate impressions of the
height of the tower, the area of the top block, and perhaps the volume of the
tower. Translating these impressions into units of height or volume requires a
deliberate operation, but the impressions themselves are highly accessible.
For other attributes, no perceptual impression exists. For example, the total
area that the blocks would cover if the tower were dismantled is not percep-
tually accessible, though it can be estimated by a deliberate procedure, such
as multiplying the area of a block by the number of blocks. Of course, the sit-
uation is reversed with Figure 2b. Now the blocks are laid out and an impres-
sion of total area is immediately accessible, but the height of the tower that
could be constructed with these blocks is not.
Some relational properties are accessible. Thus, it is obvious at a glance
Figure 2a. Figure 2b. Figure 2c.453
that Figures 2a and 2c are different, but also that they are more similar to
each other than either is to Figure 2b. And some statistical properties of en-
sembles are accessible, while others are not. For an example, consider the
question “What is the average length of the lines in Figure 3?” This question
is easy. When a set of objects of the same general kind is presented to an ob-
server – whether simultaneously or successively – a representation of the set is
computed automatically, which includes quite precise information about the
average (Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, in press). The representation of
the prototype is highly accessible, and it has the character of a percept: we
form an impression of the typical line without choosing to do so. The only
role for System 2 in this task is to map this impression of typical length onto
the appropriate scale. In contrast, the answer to the question “What is the to-
tal length of the lines in the display?” does not come to mind without consid-
erable effort.
These perceptual examples serve to establish a dimension of accessibility.
At one end of this dimension we ﬁnd operations that have the characteristics
of perception and of the intuitive System 1: they are rapid, automatic, and ef-
fortless. At the other end are slow, serial and effortful operations that people
need a special reason to undertake. Accessibility is a continuum, not a di-
chotomy, and some effortful operations demand more effort than others.
The acquisition of skill selectively increases the accessibility of useful re-
sponses and of productive ways to organize information. The master chess
player does not see the same board as the novice, and the skill of visualizing
the tower that could be built from an array of blocks could surely be im-
proved by prolonged practice. 
Determinants of accessibility
As it is used here, the concept of accessibility subsumes the notions of stimu-
lus salience, selective attention, and response activation or priming. The dif-
ferent aspects and elements of a situation, the different objects in a scene,
and the different attributes of an object – all can be more or less accessible.
What becomes accessible in any particular situation is mainly determined,
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of course, by the actual properties of the object of judgment: it is easier to
see a tower in Figure 2a than in Figure 2b, because the tower in the latter is
only virtual. Physical salience also determines accessibility: if a large green
letter and a small blue letter are shown at the same time, ‘green’ will come
to mind first. However, salience can be overcome by deliberate attention: an
instruction to look for the smaller letter will enhance the accessibility of all
its features. Motivationally relevant and emotionally arousing stimuli spon-
taneously attract attention. All the features of an arousing stimulus become
accessible, including those that are not linked to its motivational or emo-
tional significance. This fact is known, of course, to the designers of bill-
boards.
The perceptual effects of salience and of spontaneous and voluntary at-
tention have counterparts in the processing of more abstract stimuli. For ex-
ample, the statements ‘Team A beat team B’ and ‘Team B lost to team A’ con-
vey the same information. Because each sentence draws attention to its
subject, however, the two versions make different thoughts accessible.
Accessibility also reﬂects temporary states of priming and associative activa-
tion, as well as enduring operating characteristics of the perceptual and cog-
nitive systems. For example, the mention of a familiar social category tem-
porarily increases the accessibility of the traits associated with the category
stereotype, as indicated by a lowered threshold for recognizing manifesta-
tions of these traits (Higgins, 1996; for a review, see Fiske, 1998). And the
“hot” states of high emotional and motivational arousal greatly increase the
accessibility of thoughts that relate to the immediate emotion and current
needs, and reduce the accessibility of other thoughts (George Loewenstein,
1996).
Some attributes, which Tversky and Kahneman (1983) called natural as-
sessments, are routinely and automatically registered by the perceptual system
or by System 1, without intention or effort. Kahneman and Frederick (2002)
compiled a list of natural assessments, with no claim to completeness. In ad-
dition to physical properties such as size, distance and loudness, the list in-
cludes more abstract properties such as similarity (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman,
1983), causal propensity (Kahneman & Varey, 1990; Heider, 1944; Michotte,
1963), surprisingness (Kahneman & Miller, 1986), affective valence (e.g.,
Bargh, 1997; Cacioppo, Priester, & Berntson, 1993; Kahneman, Ritov, &
Schkade, 1999; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2002; Zajonc, 1980),
and mood (Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Accessibility itself is a natural assessment
– the routine evaluation of cognitive ﬂuency in perception and memory (e.g.,
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Johnson, Dark, & Jacoby, 1985; Schwarz & Vaughn,
2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).1
1 The availability heuristic is based on an assessment of accessibility, in which frequencies or prob-
abilities are judged by the ease with which instances come to mind. Tversky and I were responsib-
le for this terminological confusion (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).455
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of context on accessibility. An ambiguous
stimulus that is perceived as a letter in a context of letters is seen as a number
in a context of numbers. The ﬁgure also illustrates another point: the ambi-
guity is suppressed in perception. This aspect of the demonstration is spoiled
for the reader who sees the two versions in close proximity, but when the two
lines are shown separately, observers will not spontaneously become aware of
the alternative interpretation. They ‘see’ the interpretation that is the most
likely in its context, but have no subjective indication that it could be seen dif-
ferently. Similarly, in bi-stable pictures such as the mother/daughter ﬁgure or
the Necker cube, there is no perceptual representation of the instability. And
almost no one (for a report of a tantalizing exception, see Wittreich, 1961) is
able to see the Ames room as anything but rectangular, even when fully in-
formed that the room is distorted, and that the photograph does not provide
enough information to specify its true shape. As the transactionalists who
built the Ames room emphasized, perception is a choice of which we are not
aware, and we perceive what has been chosen.
The unpredictability that is perceived as inherent to some causal systems is
psychologically distinct from epistemic uncertainty, which is attributed to
one’s own ignorance (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982b). Competing propensities
are often perceived – as they are when we watch a close horse race. And coun-
terfactual alternatives to what happened are also perceived – we can see a
horse that was catching up at the ﬁnish as ‘almost winning the race’
(Kahneman & Varey, 1990). In contrast to competing propensities, however,
competing interpretations of reality appear to suppress each other: we do not
see each horse in a close ﬁnish as both winning and losing. Epistemic uncer-
tainty and ambiguity are not natural assessments. 
Uncertainty is poorly represented in intuition, as well as in perception.
Indeed, the concept of judgment heuristics was invented to accommodate the
observation that intuitive judgments of probability are mediated by attributes
such as similarity and associative ﬂuency, which are not intrinsically related to
uncertainty. The central ﬁnding in studies of intuitive decisions, as described
by Klein (1998), is that experienced decision makers working under pressure,
such as captains of ﬁreﬁghting companies, rarely need to choose between op-
tions because in most cases only a single option comes to their mind. The op-
tions that were rejected are not represented. Doubt is a phenomenon of
Figure 4.System 2, a meta-cognitive appreciation of one’s ability to think incompatible
thoughts about the same thing.
As this discussion illustrates, much is known about the determinants of ac-
cessibility, but there is no general theoretical account of accessibility and no
prospect of one emerging soon. In the context of research in judgment and
decision making, however, the lack of a theory does little damage to the use-
fulness of the concept. For most purposes, what matters is that empirical gen-
eralizations about the determinants of accessibility are widely accepted – and,
of course, that there are procedures for testing their validity. For example, the
claims about differential accessibility of different attributes in Figures 2 and 3
appealed to the consensual judgments of perceivers, but claims about acces-
sibility are also testable in other ways. In particular, judgments of relatively in-
accessible properties are expected to be substantially slower and more sus-
ceptible to interference by concurrent mental activity. Some tasks can be
performed even while retaining several digits in memory for subsequent re-
call, but the performance of more effortful tasks will collapse under cognitive
load. 
Considerations of accessibility and analogies between intuition and per-
ception play a central role in the programs of research that I will brieﬂy re-
view in what follows. Framing effects in decision making (Section 3) arise
when different descriptions of the same problem highlight different aspects
of the outcomes. The core idea of prospect theory (Section 4) is that changes
and differences are much more accessible than absolute levels of stimulation.
Judgment heuristics, which explain many systematic errors in beliefs and
preferences are explained in Section 5 by a process of attribute substitution:
people sometimes evaluate a difﬁcult attribute by substituting a more accessi-
ble one. Variations in the ability of System 2 to correct or override intuitive
judgments are explained by variations in the accessibility of the relevant rules
(Section 6). Diverse manifestations of the differential accessibility of averages
and sums are discussed in Section 7.
2. FRAMING EFFECTS
In Figure 2, the same property (the total height of a set of blocks) is highly ac-
cessible in one display and not in another, although both displays contain the
same information. This observation is entirely unremarkable – it does not
seem shocking that some attributes of a stimulus are automatically perceived
while others must be computed, or that the same attribute is perceived in one
display of an object but must be computed in another. In the context of deci-
sion making, however, similar observations raise a signiﬁcant challenge to the
rational-agent model. The assumption that preferences are not affected by
variations of irrelevant features of options or outcomes has been called ex-
tensionality (Arrow, 1982) and invariance (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986).
Invariance is an essential aspect of rationality, which is violated in demonstra-
tions of framing effects such as the Asian disease problem (Tversky &
Kahneman, 1981): 
456Problem 1 – The Asian Disease
Imagine that the United States is preparing for the outbreak of an un-
usual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alterna-
tive programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that
the exact scientiﬁc estimates of the consequences of the programs are
as follows:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 people
will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people will be saved
Which of the two programs would you favor?
In this version of the problem, a substantial majority of respondents favor
program A, indicating risk aversion. Other respondents, selected at random,
receive a question in which the same cover story is followed by a different de-
scription of the options:
If Program A’ is adopted, 400 people will die
If Program B’ is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody
will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die
A clear majority of respondents now favor program B’, the risk-seeking op-
tion. Although there is no substantive difference between the versions, they
evidently evoke different associations and evaluations. This is easiest to see in
the certain option, because outcomes that are certain are over-weighted rela-
tive to outcomes of high or intermediate probability (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979). Thus, the certainty of saving people is disproportionately attractive,
and the certainty of deaths is disproportionately aversive. These immediate af-
fective responses respectively favor A over B and B’ over A’. As in Figures 2a
and 2b, the different representations of the outcomes highlight some fea-
tures of the situation and mask others. 
The question of how to determine whether two decision problems are ‘the
same’ or different does not have a general answer. To avoid this issue, Tversky
and I restricted framing effects to discrepancies between choice problems
that decision makers, upon reﬂection, consider effectively identical. The
Asian disease problem passes this test: respondents who are asked to compare
the two versions almost always conclude that the same action should be taken
in both. Observers agree that it would be frivolous to let a superﬁcial detail of
formulation determine a choice that has life and death consequences.
In another famous demonstration of an embarrassing framing effect,
McNeill, Pauker, Sox and Tversky (1982) induced different choices between
surgery and radiation therapy, by describing outcome statistics in terms of
survival rates or mortality rates. Because 90% short-term survival is less threat-
ening than 10% immediate mortality, the survival frame yielded a substan-
tially higher preference for surgery. The framing effect was no less pro-
nounced among experienced physicians than it was among patients.
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the role of a judge in adjudicating the custody of a child between divorcing
parents. Each parent was described by a list of attributes. One of the descrip-
tions was richer than the other: it contained more negative and more positive
attributes. The framing of the instruction was varied. Some respondents were
asked which custody request should be accepted, others decided which re-
quest should be rejected. The rich description was favored under both in-
structions, presumably because the respondents attended to its many advan-
tages in deciding which custody request to accept, and to its many
disadvantages in deciding about rejection. 
A large-scale study by LeBoeuf and Shaﬁr (in press) examined an earlier
claim that framing effects are reduced, in a between-subjects design, for par-
ticipants with high scores on ‘need for cognition’ (Smith & Levin, 1996). The
original effect was not replicated in the more extensive study. However,
LeBoeuf, and Shaﬁr (2003) showed that more thoughtful individuals do show
greater consistency in a within-subject design, where each respondent en-
counters both versions of each problem. This result is consistent with the pre-
sent analysis. Respondents characterized by an active System 2 are more like-
ly than others to notice the relationship between the two versions and to
ensure the consistency of the responses to them. Thoughtfulness confers no
advantage in the absence of a relevant cue, and is therefore irrelevant to per-
formance in the between-subjects design. 
Framing effects are not restricted to decision-making: Simon and Hayes
(1976) documented an analogous observation in the domain of problem
solving. They constructed a collection of transformation puzzles, all formally
identical to the tower of Hanoi problem, and found that these ‘problem iso-
morphs’ varied greatly in difﬁculty. For example, the initial state and the tar-
get state were described in two of the versions as three monsters holding balls
of different colors. The state transitions were described in one version as
changes in the color of the balls, and in the other as balls being passed from
one monster to another. The puzzle was solved much more easily when
framed in terms of motion. The authors commented that “It would be possi-
ble for a subject to seek that representation which is simplest, according to
some criterion, or to translate all such problems into the same, canonical,
representation…” but “subjects will not employ such alternative strategies,
even though they are available, but will adopt the representation that consti-
tutes the most straightforward translation…” (Simon & Hayes, 1976, p 183). 
Passive adoption of the formulation given appears to be a general princi-
ple, which applies as well to these puzzles, to the displays of Figure 2, and to
the standard framing effects. People do not spontaneously compute the
height of a tower that could be built from an array of blocks, and they do
not spontaneously transform the representation of puzzles or decision
problems. It is of interest, however, that some specialized perceptual and
cognitive systems exhibit a limited ability to generate canonical representa-
tions for particular types of stimuli. Having seen a face once from a particu-
lar angle, for example, observers will recognize it from another angle, and
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they will also identify a black and white picture of it, or even a contour draw-
ing. But even the versatile face-recognition module has its limitations: its
performance is quite poor in recognizing familiar faces that are shown up-
side down. The brain mechanisms that support the comprehension of lan-
guage also have a substantial ability to strip the surface details and get to the
gist of meaning in an utterance, but this ability is limited as well. Few of us
are able to recognize ‘137 x 24’ and ‘3,288’ as ‘the same’ number without
going through some elaborate computations. Invariance cannot be
achieved by a finite mind.
The impossibility of invariance raises signiﬁcant doubts about the descrip-
tive realism of rational-choice models (Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). Absent a
system that reliably generates appropriate canonical representations, intuitive
decisions will be shaped by the factors that determine the accessibility of dif-
ferent features of the situation. Highly accessible features will inﬂuence deci-
sions, while features of low accessibility will be largely ignored. Unfortunately,
there is no reason to believe that the most accessible features are also the
most relevant to a good decision.
3. CHANGES OR STATES: PROSPECT THEORY
A general property of perceptual systems is that they are designed to enhance
the accessibility of changes and differences (Palmer, 1999). Perception is ref-
erence-dependent: the perceived attributes of a focal stimulus reﬂect the contrast
between that stimulus and a context of prior and concurrent stimuli. Figure 5
illustrates reference dependence in vision. The two enclosed squares have the
same luminance, but they do not appear equally bright. The point of the
demonstration is that the brightness of an area is not a single-parameter func-
tion of the light energy that reaches the eye from that area. An account of
perceived brightness also requires a parameter for a reference value (often
called adaptation level), which is inﬂuenced by the luminance of neighboring
areas.
Figure 5.460
The reference value to which current stimulation is compared also reﬂects
the history of adaptation to prior stimulation. A familiar demonstration in-
volves three buckets of water of different temperatures, arranged from cold
on the left to hot on the right, with tepid in the middle. In the adapting
phase, the left and right hands are immersed in cold and hot water, respec-
tively. The initially intense sensations of cold and heat gradually wane. When
both hands are then immersed in the middle bucket, the experience is heat
in the left hand and cold in the right hand.
Reference-dependence in choice
The facts of perceptual adaptation were in our minds when Tversky and I be-
gan our joint research on decision making under risk. Guided by the analogy
of perception, we expected the evaluation of decision outcomes to be refer-
ence-dependent. We noted, however, that reference-dependence is incom-
patible with the standard interpretation of Expected Utility Theory, the pre-
vailing theoretical model in this area. This deﬁciency can be traced to the
brilliant essay that introduced the ﬁrst version of expected utility theory
(Bernoulli, 1738). 
One of Bernoulli’s aims was to formalize the intuition that it makes sense
for the poor to buy insurance and for the rich to sell it. He argued that the in-
crement of utility associated with an increment of wealth is inversely propor-
tional to initial wealth, and from this plausible psychological assumption he
derived that the utility function for wealth is logarithmic. He then proposed
that a sensible decision rule for choices that involve risk is to maximize the ex-
pected utility of wealth (the moral expectation). This proposition accom-
plished what Bernoulli had set out to do: it explained risk aversion, as well as
the different risk attitudes of the rich and of the poor. The theory of expect-
ed utility that he introduced is still the dominant model of risky choice. The
language of Bernoulli’s essay is prescriptive – it speaks of what is sensible or
reasonable to do – but the theory is also intended to describe the choices of
reasonable men (Gigerenzer et al., 1989). As in most modern treatments of
decision making, there is no acknowledgment of any tension between pre-
scription and description in Bernoulli’s essay. The idea that decision makers
evaluate outcomes by the utility of ﬁnal asset positions has been retained in
economic analyses for almost 300 years. This is rather remarkable, because
the idea is easily shown to be wrong; I call it Bernoulli’s error. 
Bernoulli’s model is ﬂawed because it is reference-independent: it assumes that
the value that is assigned to a given state of wealth does not vary with the de-
cision maker’s initial state of wealth.2 This assumption ﬂies against a basic
principle of perception, where the effective stimulus is not the new level of
2 What varies with wealth in Bernoulli’s theory is the response to a given change of wealth. This
variation is represented by the curvature of the utility function for wealth. Such a function 
cannot be drawn if the utility of wealth is reference-dependent, because utility then depends not
only on current wealth but also on the reference level of wealth.stimulation, but the difference between it and the existing adaptation level.
The analogy to perception suggests that the carriers of utility are likely to be
gains and losses rather than states of wealth, and this suggestion is amply sup-
ported by the evidence of both experimental and observational studies of
choice (see Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). The present discussion will rely on
two thought experiments, of the kind that Tversky and I devised when we de-
veloped the model of risky choice that we called Prospect Theory (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979). 
Problem 2
Would you accept this gamble?
50% chance to win $150
50% chance to lose $100
Would your choice change if your overall wealth were lower by $100?
There will be few takers of the gamble in Problem 2. The experimental evi-
dence shows that most people will reject a gamble with even chances to win
and lose, unless the possible win is at least twice the size of the possible loss
(e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). The answer to the second question is, of
course, negative.
Next consider Problem 3:
Problem 3
Which would you choose?
lose $100 with certainty
or
50% chance to win $50
50% chance to lose $200
Would your choice change if your overall wealth were higher by $100?
In Problem 3, the gamble appears much more attractive than the sure loss.
Experimental results indicate that risk seeking preferences are held by a large
majority of respondents in choices of this kind (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Here again, the idea that a change of $100 in total wealth would affect pref-
erences cannot be taken seriously. 
Problems 2 and 3 evoke sharply different preferences, but from a
Bernoullian perspective the difference is a framing effect: when stated in
terms of ﬁnal wealth, the problems only differ in that all values are lower by
$100 in Problem 3 – surely an inconsequential variation. Tversky and I exam-
ined many choice pairs of this type early in our explorations of risky choice,
and concluded that the abrupt transition from risk aversion to risk seeking
could not plausibly be explained by a utility function for wealth. Preferences
appeared to be determined by attitudes to gains and losses, deﬁned relative
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to a reference point, but Bernoulli’s theory and its successors did not incor-
porate a reference point. We therefore proposed an alternative theory of risk,
in which the carriers of utility are gains and losses – changes of wealth rather
than states of wealth. Prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) embraces
the idea that preferences are reference-dependent, and includes the extra pa-
rameter that is required by this assumption. 
The distinctive predictions of prospect theory follow from the shape of the
value function, which is shown in Figure 6. The value function is deﬁned on
gains and losses and is characterized by four features: (1) it is concave in the
domain of gains, favoring risk aversion; (2) it is convex in the domain of loss-
es, favoring risk seeking; (3) Most important, the function is sharply kinked at
the reference point, and loss-averse – steeper for losses than for gains by a fac-
tor of about 2–2.5 (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1992). (4) Several studies suggest that the functions in the two
domains are fairly well approximated by power functions with similar expo-
nents, both less than unity (Swalm, 1966; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992).
However, the value function is not expected to describe preferences for loss-
es that are large relative to total assets, where ruin or near-ruin is a possible
outcome. 
Bernoulli’s error – the assumption that the carriers of utility are ﬁnal states
– is not restricted to decision making under risk. Indeed, the error of refer-
ence-independence is built into the standard representation of indifference
maps. It is puzzling to a psychologist that these maps do not include a repre-
sentation of the decision maker’s current holdings of various goods – the
counterpart of the reference point in prospect theory. The parameter is not
included, of course, because consumer theory assumes that it does not mat-
ter. 
The wealth frame
The idea that the carriers of utility are changes of wealth rather than asset po-
sitions was described as the cornerstone of prospect theory (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, p. 273). This statement implied that choices are always made
by considering gains and losses rather than ﬁnal states, but that proposition
Figure 6.must be qualiﬁed. The analysis of accessibility and framing that was presented
earlier suggests a more moderate alternative, in which (1) decision problems
can be formulated either in terms of wealth or in terms of changes; (2) the
two formulations may lead to different preferences. For an example, consid-
er Problem 4:
Problem 4
Please estimate your total wealth, call it W
Which of these situations is more attractive:
You own W
or
50% chance that you own W – $100
50% chance that you own W + $150
Informal experiments with problems of this type have consistently yielded a
mild preference for the uncertain state of wealth, and a strong impression
that the stakes mentioned in the question are entirely negligible.
In terms of ﬁnal states of wealth, Problem 4 is identical to Problem 2.
Furthermore, most respondents will agree, upon reﬂection, that the differ-
ence between the problems is inconsequential – too slight to justify different
choices. Thus, the discrepant preferences observed in these two problems sat-
isfy the deﬁnition of a framing effect. 
The manipulation of accessibility that produces this framing effect is
straightforward. The gamble of Problem 2 is likely to evoke an evaluation of
the emotions associated with the immediate outcomes, and the formulation
will not bring to mind thoughts of overall wealth. In contrast, the formulation
of Problem 4 favors a view of the uncertainty as trivially small in relation to W,
and includes no mention of gains or losses. In this perspective it is hardly sur-
prising that the two problems elicit different representations, and therefore
different preferences.
Over the centuries, Bernoulli’s theory and its successors have been applied
to decision problems in which outcomes are almost always formulated in
terms of gains and losses, without any explicit mention of either current or ﬁ-
nal states of wealth. The assumption implicit in applications of expected util-
ity theory is that outcomes described as gains or losses are ﬁrst transformed
into ﬁnal asset states, then evaluated in that representation. In light of the
preceding discussion of framing, the hypothesis of a transformation is highly
implausible, and the different responses observed in Problems 2 and in
Problem 4 provide direct evidence against it. 
The same argument also applies in the other direction. Consider a deci-
sion maker who is only presented with Problem 4. Prospect theory assumed a
preliminary operation of editing, in which prospects are reframed in simpler
terms, prior to evaluation. But Problem 2 is not a simpler version of Problem
4; it includes gains and losses, which are not mentioned in Problem 4. The
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discussion of framing suggests that Problem 4 will be evaluated as it is stated
– in terms of states of wealth. Indeed, some real-world choices are made in
that frame. In particular, ﬁnancial advisors and decision analysts often insist
on formulating outcomes in terms of assets when they elicit their clients’ pref-
erences. Prospect theory is unlikely to provide an accurate description of de-
cisions made in the wealth frame.
In experimental research as well as in the real world, the overwhelming
majority of decisions are framed as gains and losses. There has been no sys-
tematic study of the choices that people make in the wealth frame, but one of
the important properties of these choices is not in doubt: they will generally
be closer to risk neutrality than when the equivalent outcomes are framed as
gains and losses. The wealth frame favors risk neutrality in two ways. First, this
frame eliminates any mention of losses, and therefore eliminates loss aver-
sion. Second, in analogy with a familiar principle of perception, the outcomes
of small bets will appear less signiﬁcant when considered in the context of
much larger amounts of wealth. 
If Bernoulli’s formulation is transparently incorrect as a descriptive model
of risky choices, as has been argued here, why has this model been retained
for so long? The answer may well be that the assignment of utility to wealth is
an aspect of rationality, and therefore compatible with the general assump-
tion of rationality in economic theorizing. 
Consider Problem 5.
Problem 5
Two persons get their monthly report from a broker: 
A is told that her wealth went from 4M to 3M 
B is told that her wealth went from 1M to 1.1M
“Who of the two individuals has more reason
to be satisﬁed with her ﬁnancial situation?”
“Who is happier today?”
Problem 5 highlights the contrasting interpretations of utility in theories that
deﬁne outcomes as states or as changes. In Bernoulli’s analysis only the ﬁrst
of the two questions is relevant, and only long-term consequences matter.
Prospect theory, in contrast, is concerned with short-term outcomes, and the
value function presumably reﬂects an anticipation of the valence and intensi-
ty of the emotions that will be experienced at moments of transition from one
state to another (Kahneman, 2000a, b; Mellers, 2000). Which of these con-
cepts of utility is more useful? For descriptive purposes, the more myopic no-
tion is superior, but the prescriptive norms of reasonable decision making fa-
vor the long-term view. The Bernoullian deﬁnition of relevant outcomes is a
good ﬁt in a rational-agent model.
It is worth noting that an exclusive concern with the long term may be pre-
scriptively sterile, because the long term is not where life is lived. Utility can-
not be divorced from emotion, and emotion is triggered by changes. A theo-ry of choice that completely ignores feelings such as the pain of losses and the
regret of mistakes is not only descriptively unrealistic. It also leads to pre-
scriptions that do not maximize the utility of outcomes as they are actually ex-
perienced – that is, utility as Bentham conceived it (Kahneman, 1994, 2000c;
Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997).
4. ATTRIBUTE SUBSTITUTION: A MODEL OF JUDGMENT 
BY HEURISTIC
The ﬁrst joint research program that Tversky and I undertook was a study of
various types of judgment about uncertain events, including numerical pre-
dictions and assessments of the probabilities of hypotheses. We reviewed this
work in an integrative article (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which aimed to
show “that people rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which re-
duce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and predicting values to sim-
pler judgmental operations. In general, these heuristics are quite useful, but
sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors.” (p. 1124). The second
paragraph of that article introduced the idea that “the subjective assessment
of probability resembles the subjective assessments of physical quantities such
as distance or size. These judgments are all based on data of limited validity,
which are processed according to heuristic rules.” The concept of heuristic was
illustrated by the role of the blur of contours as a potent determinant of the
perceived distance of mountains. The observation that reliance on blur as a
distance cue will cause distances to be overestimated on foggy days and un-
derestimated on clear days was the example of a heuristic-induced bias. As this
example illustrates, heuristics of judgment were to be identiﬁed by the char-
acteristic errors that they inevitably cause. 
Three heuristics of judgment, labeled representativeness, availability and
anchoring, were described in the 1974 review, along with a dozen systematic
biases, including non-regressive prediction, neglect of base-rate information,
overconﬁdence and overestimates of the frequency of events that are easy to
recall. Some of the biases were identiﬁed by systematic errors in estimates of
known quantities and statistical facts. Other biases were identiﬁed by system-
atic discrepancies between the regularities of intuitive judgments and the
principles of probability theory, Bayesian inference or regression analysis.
The article deﬁned the so-called “heuristics and biases approach” to the study
of intuitive judgment, which has been the topic of a substantial research lit-
erature (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; Gilovich, Grifﬁn, & Kahneman,
2002) and has also been the focus of substantial controversy. 
Shane Frederick and I recently revisited the conception of heuristics and
biases, in the light of developments in the study of judgment and in the
broader ﬁeld of cognitive psychology in the intervening three decades
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The new model departs from the original
formulation of heuristics in three signiﬁcant ways: (i) it proposes a common
process of attribute substitution to explain how judgment heuristics work; (ii)
it extends the concept of heuristic beyond the domain of judgments about
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uncertain events; (iii) it includes an explicit treatment of the conditions un-
der which intuitive judgments will be modiﬁed or overridden by the moni-
toring operations associated with System 2. 
Attribute substitution
The 1974 article did not include a deﬁnition of judgmental heuristics.
Heuristics were described at various times as principles, as processes, or as
sources of cues for judgment. The vagueness did no damage, because the re-
search program focused on a total of three heuristics of judgment under un-
certainty, which were separately deﬁned in adequate detail. In contrast,
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) offered an explicit deﬁnition of a generic
heuristic process of attribute substitution: A judgment is said to be mediated by
a heuristic when the individual assesses a speciﬁed target attribute of a judg-
ment object by substituting a related heuristic attribute that comes more readi-
ly to mind. This deﬁnition elaborates a theme of the early research, that people
who are confronted with a difﬁcult question sometimes answer an easier 
one instead. Thus, a person who is asked “What proportion of long-distance
relationships break up within a year?” may answer as if she had been asked
“Do instances of swift breakups of long-distance relationships come readily to
mind?” This would be an application of the availability heuristic. A respon-
dent asked to assess the probability that team A will beat team B in a basket-
ball tournament may answer by mapping an impression of the relative
strength of the two teams onto the probability scale (Tversky & Koehler,
1994). This could be called a “relative strength heuristic”. In both cases, the
target attribute is low in accessibility and another attribute, which is (i) relat-
ed to the target, and (ii) highly accessible, is substituted in its place.
The word ‘heuristic’ is used in two senses in the new deﬁnition. The noun
refers to the cognitive process, and the adjective in ‘heuristic attribute’ speci-
ﬁes the substitution that occurs in a particular judgment. For example, the
representativeness heuristic is deﬁned by the use of representativeness as a
heuristic attribute to judge probability. The deﬁnition excludes anchoring ef-
fects, in which judgment is inﬂuenced by temporarily raising the accessibility
Figure 7.of a particular value of the target attribute. On the other hand, the deﬁnition
of the concept of heuristic by the process of attribute substitution greatly ex-
tends its range of application.
For a perceptual example of attribute substitution, consider the question:
“What are the sizes of the two horses in Figure 7, as they are shown on the
page?” The images are in fact identical in size, but the ﬁgure produces a com-
pelling illusion. The target attribute that the observer is instructed to report
is two-dimensional size, but the responses actually map an impression of
three-dimensional size onto units of length that are appropriate to the re-
quired judgment. In the terms of the model, three-dimensional size is the
heuristic attribute. As in other cases of attribute substitution, the illusion is
caused by differential accessibility. An impression of three-dimensional size is
the only impression of size that comes to mind for naïve observers – painters
and experienced photographers are able to do better – and it produces a per-
ceptual illusion in the judgment of picture size. The cognitive illusions that
are produced by attribute substitution have the same character: an impres-
sion of one attribute is mapped onto the scale of another, and the judge is
normally unaware of the substitution.
Direct tests of attribute substitution
An experiment described by Kahneman and Tversky (1973) illustrates a cog-
nitive illusion that arises from attribute substitution. It also illustrates a par-
ticularly strict test of the hypothesis of substitution, in a research paradigm
that Kahneman and Frederick (2002) labeled the heuristic elicitation design.
Participants were given the following description of a ﬁctitious graduate stu-
dent, which was shown along with a list of nine ﬁelds of graduate specializa-
tion.
Tom W. is of high intelligence, although lacking in true creativity. He
has a need for order and clarity, and for neat and tidy systems in which
every detail ﬁnds its appropriate place. His writing is rather dull and
mechanical, occasionally enlivened by somewhat corny puns and by
ﬂashes of imagination of the sci-ﬁ type. He has a strong drive for com-
petence. He seems to have little feel and little sympathy for other peo-
ple and does not enjoy interacting with others. Self-centered, he
nonetheless has a deep moral sense. (p.127)
Participants in a representativeness group ranked the nine ﬁelds of specializa-
tion by the degree to which Tom W. “resembles a typical graduate student”
(in that ﬁeld). Participants in a base-rate group evaluated the relative fre-
quencies of the nine ﬁelds of graduate specialization. The description of Tom
W. was deliberately constructed to make him more representative of the less
populated ﬁelds: the rank correlation between the averages of representa-
tiveness rankings and of estimated base rates was -.65. Finally, participants in
the probability group ranked the nine ﬁelds according to the likelihood of
Tom W.’s specializing in each. These respondents were graduate students in
psychology at major universities. They were given information that was in-
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tended to discredit the evidence of the personality sketch, namely that it had
been written by a psychologist when Tom W. was in high school, on the basis
of personality tests of dubious validity. 
A description based on unreliable information should be given little
weight, and predictions made in the absence of valid evidence should revert
to base rates. Statistical logic therefore dictates that the correlation between
judgments of probability and of representativeness should be negative in this
problem. In contrast, the hypothesis of attribute substitution implies that the
ranking of ﬁelds by the two measures should coincide. The results are shown
in Figure 7. The correlation between the mean judgments of representative-
ness and of probability is nearly perfect (.97), supporting attribute substitu-
tion. 
Another study in the same design involved one of the best-known charac-
ters in the heuristics and biases literature.
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in
philosophy. As a student she was deeply concerned with issues of dis-
crimination and social justice and also participated in antinuclear
demonstrations.
Respondents were shown the description of Linda and a list of eight possible
outcomes describing her present employment and activities. The two critical
items in the list were #6 (“Linda is a bank teller”) and the conjunction item
#8 (“Linda is a bank teller and active in the feminist movement”). The other
six possibilities were unrelated and miscellaneous (e.g., elementary school
teacher, psychiatric social worker). As in the Tom W. problem, some respon-
dents ranked the eight outcomes by representativeness; others ranked the
same outcomes by probability. The correlation between the mean rankings
was .99. Furthermore, the proportion of respondents who ranked the con-
junction (item #8) higher than its constituent (#6) was about the same for
representativeness (85%) and for probability (89%). The ordering of the two




































































Figure 8.image of a feminist bank teller more than she resembles a stereotypical bank
teller. However, the reliance on representativeness as a heuristic attribute
yields a pattern of probability judgments that violates monotonicity, and has
been called the ‘conjunction fallacy’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
The results shown in Figure 8 are especially compelling because the re-
sponses were rankings. The large variability of the average rankings of both
attributes indicates highly consensual responses, and nearly total overlap in
the systematic variance. Stronger support for attribute-substitution could
hardly be imagined, and it is surprising that this evidence was not acknow-
ledged in subsequent debates about the validity of judgment heuristics. Other
tests of representativeness in the heuristic elicitation design have been equal-
ly successful (Bar-Hillel & Neter, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982). The
same design was also applied extensively in studies of support theory (Tversky
& Koehler, 1994; for a review see Brenner, Koehler & Rottenstreich, 2002). In
one of the studies reported by Tversky and Koehler (1994), participants rated
the probability that the home team would win in each of 20 speciﬁed basket-
ball games, and later provided ratings of the relative strength of the two
teams, using a scale in which the strongest team in the tournament was as-
signed a score of 100. The correlation between normalized strength ratings
and judged probabilities was .99. 
The essence of attribute substitution is that respondents offer a reasonable
answer to a question that they have not been asked. An alternative interpre-
tation that must be considered is that the respondents’ judgments reﬂect
their understanding of the question they were asked. This may be true in
some situations: it is not unreasonable to interpret a question about the prob-
able outcome of a basketball game as referring to the relative strength of the
competing teams. But the idea that judgments signify a commitment to the
interpretation of the target attribute does not generally hold. For example, it
is highly unlikely that educated respondents have a concept of probability
that coincides precisely with similarity, or that they are unable to distinguish
picture size from object size. A more plausible hypothesis is that an evaluation
of the heuristic attribute comes immediately to mind, and that its associative
relationship with the target attribute is sufﬁciently close to pass the monitor-
ing of a permissive System 2. Respondents who substitute one attribute for an-
other are not confused about the question that they are trying to answer –
they simply fail to notice that they are answering a different one. And when
they do notice the discrepancy, they either modify the intuitive judgment or
abandon it altogether.
The new heuristics
As illustrated by its use in the interpretation of the visual illusion of Figure 7,
the deﬁnition of judgment heuristics by the mechanism of attribute substitu-
tion applies to many situations in which people make a judgment that is not
the one they intended to make. There is no ﬁnite list of heuristic attributes.
Kahneman and Frederick (2002) illustrated this conception by a study by
Strack, Martin, and Schwarz (1988), in which college students answered a sur-
469vey that included these two questions: “How happy are you with your life in
general?” and “How many dates did you have last month?”. The correlation
between the two questions was negligible when they occurred in the order
shown, but it rose to 0.66 when the dating question was asked ﬁrst. The mod-
el of attribute substitution suggests that the dating question automatically
evokes an affectively charged evaluation of one’s satisfaction in that domain
of life, which lingers to become the heuristic attribute when the happiness
question is subsequently encountered. The underlying correlation between
the target and heuristic attributes is surely higher than the observed value of
0.66, which is attenuated by measurement error. The same experimental ma-
nipulation of question order was used in another study to induce the use of
marital satisfaction as a heuristic attribute for well-being (Schwarz, Strack, &
Mai, 1991). The success of these experiments suggests that ad hoc attribute
substitution is a frequent occurrence.
The idea of an affect heuristic (Slovic et al., 2002) is probably the most im-
portant development in the study of judgment heuristics in the last decades.
There is compelling evidence for the proposition that every stimulus evokes
an affective evaluation, which is not always conscious (see reviews by Zajonc,
1980, 1997; Bargh, 1997). Affective valence is a natural assessment, and there-
fore a candidate for substitution in the numerous responses that express atti-
tudes. Slovic and his colleagues (Slovic et al., 2002) discuss how a basic affec-
tive reaction can be used as the heuristic attribute for a wide variety of more
complex evaluations, such as the cost/beneﬁt ratio of technologies, the safe
concentration of chemicals, and even the predicted economic performance
of industries. Their treatment of the affect heuristic ﬁts the present model of
attribute substitution. 
In the same vein, Kahneman and Ritov (1994) and Kahneman, Ritov, and
Schkade (1999) proposed that an automatic affective valuation – the emo-
tional core of an attitude – is the main determinant of many judgments and
behaviors. In the study by Kahneman and Ritov (1994), 37 public causes were
ranked by average responses to questions about (i) the importance of the is-
sues, (ii) the size of the donation that respondents were willing to make, (iii)
political support for interventions, and (iv) the moral satisfaction associated
with a contribution. The rankings were all very similar. In the terms of the
present analysis, the same heuristic attribute (affective valuation) was
mapped onto the distinct scales of a wide range of target attributes. Similarly,
Kahneman, Schkade, and Sunstein (1998) interpreted jurors’ assessments of
punitive awards as a mapping of outrage onto a dollar scale of punishments.
In an article titled “Risk as Feelings”, Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch
(2001), offered a closely related analysis in which emotional responses, such
as the intensity of fear, govern diverse judgments (e.g., ratings of the proba-
bility of a disaster). 
In terms of the scope of responses that it governs, the natural assessment of
affect should join representativeness and availability in the list of general-pur-
pose heuristic attributes. The failure to identify the affect heuristic much ear-
lier, as well as its enthusiastic acceptance in recent years, reﬂect signiﬁcant
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that in the early 1970’s the idea of purely cognitive biases appeared novel and
distinctive, because the prevalence of motivated and emotional biases of judg-
ment was taken for granted by the social psychologists of the time. There fol-
lowed a period of intense emphasis on cognitive processes, in psychology gen-
erally and in the ﬁeld of judgment in particular. It took another thirty years to
achieve what now appears to be a more integrated view of the role of affect in
intuitive judgment.
5. THE ACCESSIBILITY OF CORRECTIVE THOUGHTS
The present treatment assumes that System 2 is involved in all voluntary ac-
tions – including overt expressions of the intuitive judgments that originated
in System 1. This assumption implies that errors of intuitive judgment involve
failures of both systems: System 1, which generated the error, and System 2
which failed to detect and correct it (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982a). To illus-
trate this point, Kahneman and Frederick (2002) revisited the perceptual
analogy that Tversky and Kahneman (1974) had used to explain how judg-
ment heuristics generate biases: blur is a good cue to the distance of moun-
tains, but reliance on this cue causes predictable errors of distance estimation
on sunny or hazy days. The analogy was apt, but the analysis of the perceptu-
al example neglected an important fact. Observers know, of course, whether
the day is sunny or hazy, and they could use this knowledge to counteract the
bias – but most often they do not. Contrary to what the early treatment im-
plied, the use of blur as a cue does not inevitably lead to bias in the judgment
of distance – the illusion could just as well be described as a failure to assign
adequate negative weight to ambient haze. The effect of haziness on impres-
sions of distance is a failing of System 1: the perceptual system is not designed
to correct for this variable. The effect of haziness on judgments of distance is a
separate failure of System 2. Analogous failures can be identiﬁed in other er-
rors of intuitive judgment. 
It is useful to consider how System 2 might have intervened in the prob-
lems of Tom W. and Linda that were described in an earlier section.
“Tom W. does look like a library science person, but there are many
more graduate students in Humanities and Social Sciences. I should ad-
just my rankings accordingly.” “Linda cannot be more likely to be a fem-
inist bank teller than to be a bank teller. I must rank these two out-
comes accordingly”
These hypothetical samples of reasoning illustrate two ways in which intuitive
judgments can be corrected. In the Tom W. example, the individual becomes
aware of a factor that was not part of the intuitive judgment, and makes an ef-
fort to adjust accordingly. In the Linda example, the individual recognizes
that the question can be answered by applying a decisive logical rule, which
makes intuitions to the contrary irrelevant. Both would come under the
rubric of “statistical heuristics”, which people are sometimes capable of de-
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Kunda, 1983/2002).
Neither of these examples of reasoning exceeds the intellectual reach of
the graduate students at major universities whose rankings were shown in
Figure 8. However, the data indicate that very few respondents actually came
up with corrections. The puzzle is the same as in the blur illusion: why did
these people not put their knowledge to good use? In the context of the pre-
sent treatment, the question can be rephrased: Why did the statistical heuris-
tics not become accessible when they were needed?
An important part of the answer is that attribute substitution is a silent
process: the respondents who judge probability as if they had been asked to
judge representativeness are not self-conscious about what they are doing.
The substitute attribute is pertinent to the task, and its value comes to mind
with little or no effort and with high conﬁdence. There is therefore little rea-
son for respondents to question their judgment, perhaps even less than in the
bat-and-ball problem that was mentioned earlier. In contrast, the accessibility
of statistical heuristics is often low, but it can be enhanced in at least two ways:
by increasing the vigilance of the monitoring activities, or by providing
stronger cues to the relevant rules. 
A substantial research program was mounted by Nisbett, Krantz and their
colleagues to investigate the factors that control the accessibility of statistical
heuristics (Nisbett et al., 1983/2002). For example, Nisbett et al. studied for-
mally identical problems in several domains. They found that statistical rea-
soning was most likely to be evoked in the context of games of chance, occa-
sionally evoked in situations involving sports, but relatively rare when the
problems concerned the psychology of individuals. They also showed that the
explicit mention of a sampling procedure facilitated statistical thinking
(Nisbett et al., 1983; see also Gigerenzer, Hell, & Blank, 1988). Zukier and
Pepitone (1984) found that respondents were more likely to use base-rate in-
formation when instructed to think as statisticians than when instructed to
emulate psychologists. Agnoli and Krantz (1989) found that brief training in
the logic of sets improved performance in a simple version of the Linda prob-
lem. Considerations of accessibility are evidently relevant to the activation of
statistical reasoning, not only to attribute substitution. 
Nisbett, Krantz and their colleagues drew a sharp distinction between their
statistical heuristics and the intuitive heuristics, which they described as
“rapid and more or less automatic judgmental rules of thumb” (2002, p. 510).
In the same vein, the present treatment assigns the competing heuristics to
different cognitive systems. Attribute substitution has been described as an
operation of System 1, which occurs automatically and effortlessly. In con-
trast, the statistical heuristics illustrate the rule-governed reasoning of System
2 (Sloman, 1996), which is deliberate and demands some effort. It is worth
noting that the intervention of System 2 and the application of statistical
heuristics and other rules do not guarantee a correct response. The rules that
people apply in deliberate reasoning are sometimes false.
An implication of the view of intuition that has been proposed here is that
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tiveness, but only enables people to avoid some biases under favorable cir-
cumstances. The results shown in Figure 8, which were collected from statis-
tically knowledgeable graduate students, support this prediction. In the
absence of strong cues to remind them of their statistical knowledge, these re-
spondents made categorical predictions like everybody else – by representa-
tiveness. However, statistical sophistication made a difference in a stripped-
down version of the Linda problem, which required respondents to compare
the probabilities of Linda being “a bank teller” or “a bank teller who is active
in the feminist movement” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). The incidence of
errors remained high for the statistically naïve even in that transparent ver-
sion, but the error rate dropped dramatically among the sophisticated. 
The efﬁcacy of System 2 is impaired by time pressure (Finucane, Alhakami,
Slovic, & Johnson, 2000) by concurrent involvement in a different cognitive
task (Gilbert, 1989, 1991, 2002), by performing the task in the evening for
‘morning people’ and in the morning for ‘evening people’ (Bodenhausen,
1990), and, surprisingly, by being in a good mood (Isen, Nygren, & Ashby,
1988; Bless et al., 1996). Conversely, the facility of System 2 is positively corre-
lated with intelligence (Stanovich & West, 2002), with ‘need for cognition’
(Shaﬁr & LeBoeuf, 2002), and with exposure to statistical thinking (Nisbett et
al., 1983; Agnoli & Krantz, 1989; Agnoli, 1991). 
The observation that it is possible to design experiments in which ‘cogni-
tive illusions disappear’ has sometimes been used as an argument against the
usefulness of the notions of heuristics and biases (for example, Gigerenzer,
1991). In the present framework, however, there is no mystery about the con-
ditions under which illusions appear or disappear. An intuitive judgment that
violates a rule which the respondent accepts will be overridden, if the rule
comes early enough to the respondent’s mind. This argument is not circular,
because we have adequate scientiﬁc knowledge (as well as widely shared folk
knowledge) about the conditions that facilitate or impede the accessibility of
logical or statistical rules.
The examples of possible corrections in the Tom W. and Linda problems il-
lustrated two possible outcomes of the intervention of System 2: the intuitive
judgment may be adjusted, or else rejected and replaced by another conclu-
sion. A general prediction can be made about the former case, which is cer-
tainly the most frequent. Because the intuitive impression comes ﬁrst, it is like-
ly to serve as an anchor for subsequent adjustments, and corrective adjustments
from anchors are normally insufﬁcient. Variations on this theme are common
in the literature (Epley & Gilovich, 2002; Epstein, 1994; Gilbert, 2002; Grifﬁn &
Tversky, 1992; Sloman, 2002; Wilson, Centerbar, & Brekke, 2002). 
The methodological implication of this analysis is that intuitive judgments
and preferences are best studied in between-subject designs. Within-subject
designs with multiple trials encourage the adoption of simplifying strategies
in which answers are computed mechanically, without delving into the
speciﬁcs of each problem. Factorial designs are particularly undesirable, be-
cause they provide an unmistakable cue that every factor that is manipulated
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propriate to study intuitive judgments in conditions that are guaranteed to
destroy their intuitive character. The difﬁculties of these experimental de-
signs were noted long ago by Kahneman and Tversky (1982a), who pointed
out that “Within-subject designs are associated with signiﬁcant problems of in-
terpretation in several areas of psychological research (Poulton, 1975). In
studies of intuition, they are liable to induce the effect that they are intended
to test” (p. 500). Unfortunately, this methodological caution has been widely
ignored.
6. PROTOTYPE HEURISTICS
This section introduces a family of prototype heuristics, which share a com-
mon mechanism and a remarkably consistent pattern of cognitive illusions,
analogous to the effects observed in the Tom W. and in the Linda problems
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Prototype heuristics can be roughly de-
scribed as the substitution of an average for a sum – a process that has been
extensively studied by Anderson in other contexts (e.g., Anderson, 1981, ch.
pp. 58–70; 1991a,b). The section also discusses the conditions under which
System 2 prevents or reduces the biases associated with these heuristics. 
Extensional and prototype attributes
The target assessments in several signiﬁcant tasks of judgment and decision
making are extensional attributes of categories or sets. The value of an exten-
sional attribute in a set is an aggregate (not necessarily additive) of the values
over its extension. Each of the following tasks is illustrated by an example of
an extensional attribute and by the relevant measure of extension. The argu-
ment of this section is that the extensional attributes in these tasks are low in
accessibility, and are therefore candidates for heuristic substitution.
(i) category prediction (e.g., the probability that the set of bank tellers contains
Linda / the number of bank tellers);
(ii) pricing a quantity of public or private goods (e.g., the personal dollar 
value of saving a certain number of birds from drowning in oil ponds / the num-
ber of birds);
(iii) global evaluation of a past experience that extended over time (e.g., the
overall aversiveness of a painful medical procedure / the duration of the proce-
dure);
(iv) assessment of the support that a sample of observations provides for a
hypothesis (e.g., the probability that a speciﬁed sample of colored balls has been
drawn from one urn rather than another / the number of balls).
Extensional attributes are governed by a general principle of conditional
adding, which dictates that each element of the set adds to the overall value
an amount that depends on the elements already included. In simple cases,
the value is additive: the total length of the set of lines in Figure 3 is just the
sum of their separate lengths. In other cases, each positive element of the set
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increases the aggregate value, but the combination rule is non-additive (typi-
cally sub-additive).3
A category or set which is sufﬁciently homogeneous to have a prototype
can also be described by its prototype attributes. Where extensional attributes
are akin to a sum, prototype attributes are averages. As the display of lines in
Figure 3 illustrated, prototype attributes are often highly accessible. This ob-
servation is well-documented. Whenever we look at, or think about, an en-
semble or category that has a prototype, information about the prototype be-
comes accessible. The classic discussion of basic-level categories included
demonstrations of the ease with which features of the prototype come to
mind (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Even earlier, Posner and Keele (1968, 1970)
had reported experiments in which observers were exposed on many trials to
various distortions of a single shape. The prototype shape was never shown,
but observers erroneously believed that it had been presented often. More re-
cently, several studies in social psychology have shown that exposure to the
name of a familiar social category increases the accessibility of the traits that
are closely associated with its stereotype (see Fiske, 1998). 
Because of their high accessibility, the prototype attributes are natural can-
didates for the role of heuristic attributes. A prototype heuristic is the label for
the process of substituting an attribute of a prototype for an extensional at-
tribute of its category (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). The original instance
of a prototype heuristic was the use of representativeness in category predic-
tion. The probability of Linda being a bank teller is an extensional variable,
but her resemblance to a typical bank teller is a prototype attribute. 
Two tests of prototype heuristics
Because extensional and prototypical attributes are governed by characteris-
tically different rules, the substitution of a prototype attribute for an exten-
sional attribute entails two testable biases: extension neglect and violations of
monotonicity. Tests of the two hypotheses are discussed in turn.
Tests of extension neglect
Doubling the frequencies of all values in a set will not affect prototype 
attributes, because measures of central tendency depend only on relative 
frequencies. In contrast, the value of an extensional attribute will increase
monotonically with extension. The hypothesis that judgments of a target 
attribute are mediated by a prototype heuristic gains support if the judgments
are insensitive to variations of extension. 
The proposition that extension is neglected in a particular judgment has
the character of a null hypothesis: it is strictly true only if all individuals in the
3 If the judgment is monotonically related to an additive scale (such as the underlying count of
the number of birds), the formal structure is known in the measurement literature as an “exten-
sive structure” (Luce, Krantz, Suppes & Tversky, 1990, Chapter 3). There also may be attributes
that lack any underlying additive scale, in which case the structure is known in the literature as a
“positive concatenation structure” (Luce et al., 1990, Chapter 19, vol. III, p. 38).sample are completely insensitive to variations of extension. The hypothesis
will be rejected, in a sufﬁciently large study, if even a small proportion of par-
ticipants show some sensitivity to extension. The chances of some individuals
responding to extension are high a priori, because educated respondents are
generally aware of the relevance of this variable (Kahneman & Frederick,
2002). Everyone agrees that WTP for saving birds should increase with the
number of birds saved, that extending a painful medical procedure by an ex-
tra period of pain makes it worse, and that evidence from larger samples is
more reliable. Complete extension neglect is therefore an unreasonably strict
test of prototype heuristics. Nevertheless, this extreme result can be obtained
under favorable conditions, as the following examples show:
• The study of Tom W. (see Figure 8) illustrated a pattern of base-rate neglect
in categorical prediction. This ﬁnding is robust when the task requires a
ranking of multiple outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). As noted in
the preceding section, the sophisticated participants in this experiment
were aware of the base-rates and were capable of using this knowledge in
their predictions – but the thought of doing so apparently occurred to al-
most none of them. Kahneman and Tversky also documented almost com-
plete neglect of base-rates in an experiment (the engineer/lawyer study)
in which base-rates were explicitly stated. However, the neglect of explicit
base-rate information in this design is a fragile ﬁnding (see Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002; Koehler, 1996, Evans, Handley, Over, & Perham, 2002).
• Participants in a study by Desvousges et al., (1993) indicated their willing-
ness to contribute money to prevent the drowning of migratory birds. The
number of birds that would be saved was varied for different sub-samples.
The estimated amounts that households were willing to pay were $80, $78
and $88, to save 2,000, 20,000, or 200,000 birds, respectively. Frederick and
Fischhoff (1998) reviewed numerous other demonstrations of scope neglect
in studies of willingness to pay (WTP) for public goods. For example,
Kahneman and Knetsch found that survey respondents in Toronto were
willing to pay almost as much to clean up the lakes in a small region of
Ontario or to clean up all the lakes in that province (reported by
Kahneman, 1986). 
• In a study described by Redelmeier and Kahneman (1996), patients un-
dergoing colonoscopy reported the intensity of pain every 60 seconds dur-
ing the procedure (see Figure 9), and subsequently provided a global evalu-
ation of the pain they had suffered. The correlation of global evaluations
with the duration of the procedure (which ranged from 4 to 66 minutes in
that study) was .03. On the other hand global evaluations were correlated
(r =.67) with an average of the pain reported on two occasions: when pain
was at its peak, and just before the procedure ended. For example, patient
A in Figure 9 reported a more negative evaluation of the procedure than
patient B. The same pattern of duration neglect and Peak/End evaluations
has been observed in other studies (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; see
Kahneman, 2000b, 2000c for a discussion). 
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In light of the ﬁndings discussed in the preceding section, it is useful to
consider situations in which people will not neglect extension completely.
Extension effects are expected, in the present model, if the individual (i) has
information about the extension of the relevant set; (ii) is reminded of the
relevance of extension; and (iii) is able to detect that her intuitive judgments
neglect extension. These conditions are least likely to hold – and complete
neglect most likely to be observed – when the judge evaluates a single object
and when the extension of the set is not explicitly mentioned. At the other ex-
treme, the conditions for a positive effect of extension are all satisﬁed in psy-
chologists’ favorite research design: the within-subject factorial experiment,
in which values of extension are crossed with the values of other variables in
the design. As noted earlier, this design provides an obvious cue that the ex-
perimenter considers every manipulated variable relevant, and it enables par-
ticipants to ensure that their judgments exhibit sensitivity to all these vari-
ables. The factorial design is therefore especially inappropriate for testing
hypotheses about biases of neglect (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002).
In spite of these objections, within-subject factorial designs have been used
in several experimental studies of extension neglect. Figure 10 illustrates the
remarkably consistent additive extension effect that has emerged in these exper-
iments (Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000). In each of the experiments, the ex-
tension variable has a slight but signiﬁcant effect, and combines additively
with other information. The additivity is noteworthy, because it is normative-
ly inappropriate. For each panel of Figure 10, a compelling normative argu-
ment can be made for a quasi-multiplicative rule in which the lines should 
fan out.4 The observed pattern is compatible with a process of anchoring and
adjustment: the intuitive judgment provides an anchor, and small adjust-





















































Figure 9. Pain intensity reported by two colonoscopy patients.
4 Anderson (1996, p. 253) has described several other situations in which variables that should be
combined multiplicatively are combined additively.478
Tests of monotonicity
Extensional variables, like sums, obey monotonicity. The sum of a set of posi-
tive values is at least as high as the maximum of its subsets. In contrast, the
average of a subset can be higher than the average of a set that includes it.
Violations of monotonicity are therefore bound to occur when an extension-
al attribute is judged by a prototype attribute: it must be possible to ﬁnd 
cases in which adding elements to a set causes the judgment of the target vari-
able to decrease. This test of prototype heuristics is less demanding than the
hypothesis of extension neglect, and violations of monotonicity are compatib-
le with some degree of sensitivity to extension (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2000).
Nevertheless, violations of monotonicity in important tasks of judgment and
choice are the strongest source of support for the hypothesis that prototype 
attributes are substituted for extensional attributes in these tasks. 
• Conjunction errors, which violate monotonicity, have been demonstrated
in the Linda problem and in other problems of the same type. There are
no documented exceptions to the predicted pattern when the judgments
are obtained in a between-subjects design, or when the two critical out-
Figure 10. (a) Willingness to pay to restore damage to species that differ in popularity as a
function of the damage they have suffered (from Kahneman, Ritov, & Schkade, 1999); (b)
Global evaluations of aversive sounds of different loudness as a function of duration for
subjects selected for their high sensitivity to duration (from Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000);
(c) Ratings of probability for predictions that differ in representativeness as a function of
base-rate frequency (from Novemsky & Kronzon, 1999); (d) Global evaluations of episodes













































































































































comes are embedded in a longer list (Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, 1983;
Mellers, Hertwig, & Kahneman, 2001). Tversky and Kahneman (1983) 
also found that statistically naïve respondents made conjunction errors
even in a direct comparison of the critical outcomes. As in the case of 
extension neglect, however, conjunction errors are less robust in within-
subject conditions, especially when the task involves a direct comparison
(see Kahneman & Frederick, 2002 for a discussion). 
•H see (1999) asked participants to price sets of dinnerware offered in a
clearance sale. One of the sets (A) consisted of 24 pieces, all in good con-
dition. The other set included the same 24 pieces, plus 16 additional
pieces, of which 7 were in a good condition and 9 were broken. When
each respondent evaluated only one set, mean willingness to pay (WTP)
was $33 for the smaller set and $23 for the larger set (p < .01). In contrast,
participants who evaluated both sets were consistently willing to pay more
for the larger set. List (2002) observed similar violations of dominance
with a different good (sets of baseball cards), in a real market situation.
•P roblems of the following kind have been used in several experiments
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Grifﬁn & Tversky, 1992).
A sample has been drawn from one of two urns. One urn contains 70%
red balls and 30% white balls. The proportions are reversed in the other
urn. What is the probability that each of these samples was drawn from
the predominantly red urn?
A sample of three red balls and zero white balls (3R, 0W)
A sample of four red balls and three white balls (4R, 3W)
A sample of seven red balls and three white balls (7R, 3W)
The extensional target variable here is the degree of support for the ‘red’
hypothesis relative to the ‘white’ hypothesis. The normative solution is
straightforward: posterior probability (the target attribute) is determined
by an additive combination over sample elements – the difference be-
tween the number of red and white balls in the sample. The psychological
solution is equally straightforward: the prototype attribute (the heuristic)
is an average of support, which corresponds to the proportion of red balls
in the sample. Thus, the addition of (4R, 3W) to (3R, 0W) raises the value
of the target attribute but reduces the value of the heuristic attribute. This
particular example is ﬁctitious, but the pattern of ﬁndings indicates that
respondents would derive much more conﬁdence from (3R, 0W) than
from (7R, 3W) (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972; Grifﬁn & Tversky, 1992).
•A   randomized clinical experiment was conducted as a follow-up to the
colonoscopy study described earlier. For half the patients, the instrument
was not immediately removed when the clinical examination ended.
Instead, the physician waited for about a minute, leaving the instrument
stationary. The experience during the extra period was uncomfortable,
but the procedure guaranteed that the colonoscopy never ended in severe
pain. Patients reported signiﬁcantly more favorable global evaluations in
this experimental condition than in the control condition (Redelmeier,Katz, & Kahneman, in press). Violations of dominance have also been con-
ﬁrmed in choices. Kahneman, Fredrickson, Schreiber, and Redelmeier
(1993) exposed participants to two cold-pressor experiences, one with
each hand: a “short” episode (immersion of one hand in 14˚C water for 60
seconds), and a “long” episode (the short episode, plus an additional 30
seconds during which the water was gradually warmed to 15˚C). When
they were later asked which of the two experiences they preferred to re-
peat, a substantial majority chose the long trial. This pattern of choices is
predicted from the Peak/End rule of evaluation, which was described ear-
lier. The same pattern of results was found with unpleasant sounds of vari-
able loudness and duration (Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000).
The consistency of the results observed in diverse studies of prototype heuris-
tics suggests the need for a uniﬁed interpretation, and challenges interpreta-
tions that only apply to a single domain. A number of authors have offered
competing interpretations of base-rate neglect (Cosmides & Tooby, 1996;
Koehler, 1996), insensitivity to scope in WTP (Kopp, 1992), and duration neg-
lect (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2000). In general however, these interpretations
are speciﬁc to a particular task, and would not carry over to demonstrations
of extension neglect in the other tasks that have been discussed here.
Similarly, the attempts to describe the conjunction fallacy as a miscommuni-
cation between experimenter and respondent (Dulany & Hilton, 1991;
Hilton & Slugoski, 2001) do not explain analogous violations of monotonici-
ty in the cold-pressor experiment and in the pricing of private goods. In con-
trast, the account offered here (and developed in greater detail by
Kahneman & Frederick, 2002) is equally applicable to diverse tasks that re-
quire an assessment of an extensional target attribute. 
The ﬁndings obtained in choices and joint evaluations conﬁrm the exis-
tence of two distinct ways of choosing, which were already identiﬁed in
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In the non-analytic procedure
that I have called “choosing by liking” (Kahneman, 1994), the individual con-
siders the global evaluation of the two options separately, and selects the one
that has the higher global value, without detailed comparison of the options.
Choice by global value was the basic mechanism assumed in prospect theory.
However, prospect theory also introduced the idea that if the individual de-
tects that one option dominates the other, the dominant option will be cho-
sen without consulting their separate valuations. The same mechanisms apply
to problems of judgment, such as the case of Linda, where some statistically
sophisticated individuals detect that one of the sets includes the other and re-
spond accordingly, ignoring representativeness. In Hsee’s dinnerware study
(1998), respondents chose by liking in separate evaluation, and chose by
dominance in joint evaluation. 
Joint evaluation is not sufﬁcient to guarantee choice by dominance; it is al-
so necessary for the decision makers to realize explicitly that one of the op-
tions is strictly better than the other. This requirement was not satisﬁed in the
cold-pressor experiment. Although the participants were exposed to both ex-
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tained all the pain of the short one, and then some extra pain. Most respon-
dents would have made a different choice if they had understood the struc-
ture of the options. 
The normative logic of belief and choice is extensional, and it requires ap-
propriate valuation of extensional attributes, which include both probability
and utility. The examples that were discussed in this section demonstrate a
pervasive departure from extensional logic, in the intuitive evaluation of both
evidence and outcomes. The substitution of prototype attributes for exten-
sional attributes appears to be a general characteristic of System 1, which is in-
compatible with both Bayesian beliefs and utility maximization. 
CONCLUSIONS
The starting point of the present analysis was the observation that complex
judgments and preferences are called ‘intuitive’ in everyday language if they
come to mind quickly and effortlessly, like percepts. Another basic observa-
tion was that judgments and intentions are normally intuitive in this sense,
but can be modiﬁed or overridden in a more deliberate mode of operation.
The labels ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ were associated with these two modes of
cognitive functioning. 
The preceding sections elaborated a single generic proposition: “Highly ac-
cessible impressions produced by System 1 control judgments and prefer-
ences, unless modiﬁed or overridden by the deliberate operations of System
2.” This template sets an agenda for research: to understand judgment and
choice we must study the determinants of high accessibility, the conditions
under which System 2 will override or correct System 1, and the rules of these
corrective operations. Much is known about each of the three questions.
First, consider the ways in which the concept of accessibility was used here.
Framing effects were attributed to the fact that alternative formulations of the
same situation make different aspects of it accessible. The core idea of
prospect theory, that the normal carriers of utility are gains and losses, in-
voked a general principle that changes are relatively more accessible than ab-
solute values. Judgment heuristics were explained as the substitution of a
highly accessible heuristic attribute for a less accessible target attribute.
Finally, the proposition that averages are more accessible than sums uniﬁed
the analysis of prototype heuristics. A recurrent theme was that different as-
pects of problems are made accessible in between-subjects and in within-sub-
ject experiments, and more speciﬁcally in separate and joint evaluations of
stimuli. In all these cases, the discussion appealed to rules of accessibility that
are independently plausible and sometimes quite obvious.
The status of accessibility factors in psychological theorizing is, in princi-
ple, similar to the status of perceptual grouping factors. In both cases there is
no general theory, only a list of powerful empirical generalizations that pro-
vide a sound basis for experimental predictions and for models of higher-
level phenomena. Unlike Gestalt principles, which were catalogued a long
481time ago, a comprehensive list of the factors that inﬂuence accessibility is yet
to be drawn. The list will be long, but many of its elements are already known.
For example, it is safe to assume that similarity is more accessible than proba-
bility, that changes are more accessible than absolute values, and that aver-
ages are more accessible than sums. Furthermore, each of these assumptions
can be veriﬁed independently by multiple operations, including measure-
ments of reaction time, susceptibility to interference by secondary tasks, and
asymmetric priming. Assumptions about accessibility are incompletely theo-
rized, but they need not be vague and they can do genuine explanatory work.
The present discussion of accessibility effects has been restricted to the dif-
ferential accessibility of attributes (dimensions) on which judgment objects
vary, such as length or price, similarity and probability, (Kahneman &
Frederick, 2002). A similar analysis could be applied to the accessibility of
particular values of attributes, such as ‘six feet’ or ‘two dollars’. Highly acces-
sible values are generally overweighted, and when considered as possible an-
swers to a question they become potent anchors (Epley & Gilovich, 2002;
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997; Chapman & Johnson, 2002). The effects of
salience and anchoring play a central role in treatments of judgment and
choice. Indeed, anchoring effects are among the most robust phenomena of
judgment, and overweighting of salient values is likely to be the mechanism
that explains why low-probability events sometimes loom large in decision
making. The analysis of accessibility could readily be extended to deal with
these observations.
The claim that cognitive illusions will occur unless they are prevented by
System 2 sounds circular, but it is not. Circular inferences are avoidable be-
cause the role of System 2 can be independently veriﬁed in several ways. For
example, the assumption that System 2 is vulnerable to interference by com-
peting activities suggests that manifestations of intuitive thought that are nor-
mally inhibited may be expressed when people are placed under cognitive
load. Another testable hypothesis is that intuitive judgments that are sup-
pressed by System 2 still have detectable effects, e.g., in priming subsequent
responses. 
Principles of accessibility determine the relative power of the cues to which
the monitoring functions of System 2 respond. For example, we know that
differences between options are more salient in joint than in separate evalua-
tion, and that any variable which is manipulated in a factorial design will at-
tract some attention. Other cues can be found in the wording of problems
and in the context of previous tasks. Many apparent inconsistencies in the lit-
erature on judgment heuristics are easily resolved within this framework
(Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). A judgment bias that appears in some situa-
tions but not in others usually provides information about the factors that
control corrective operations. As already noted, the attribution of the vari-
ability of intuitive judgments to System 2 is a source of readily testable hy-
potheses. It suggests, for example, that intelligence will be correlated with
susceptibility to biases only in problems that provide relatively weak cues to
the correct solution. In the absence of cues, there is no opportunity for intel-
482483
ligence or sophistication to manifest itself. When cues are abundant, at the
other extreme, even the moderately intelligent will ﬁnd them (Kahneman,
2000a; Stanovich & West, 1999, 2002).
The model suggests four ways in which a judgment or choice may be made: 
(i) no intuitive response comes to mind, and the judgment is produced by
System 2. 
(ii) an intuitive judgment or intention is evoked, and
a. is endorsed by System 2; 
b. serves as an anchor for adjustments that respond to other features of
the situation; 
c. is identiﬁed as incompatible with a subjectively valid rule, and blocked
from overt expression. 
There is of course no way to ascertain precisely the relative frequencies of
these outcomes, but casual observation suggests the following ordering, from
most to least frequent: 
(iia) – (iib) – (i) – (iic)
Most behavior is intuitive, skilled, unproblematic and successful (Klein,
1998). In some fraction of cases, a need to correct the intuitive judgments
and preferences will be acknowledged, but the intuitive impression will be the
anchor for the judgment. Under-correction is more likely than over-correc-
tion in such cases. A conservative general prediction is that variables that are
neglected in intuition will remain underweighted in considered judgments. 
The analysis of intuitive thinking and choice that has been presented here
provides a framework which highlights commonalities between lines of re-
search that are usually studied separately. In particular, the psychology of
judgment and the psychology of choice share their basic principles, and dif-
fer mainly in content. At a more speciﬁc level, prototype heuristics solve
structurally similar problems in diverse domains, where they yield closely 
similar patterns of results. Furthermore, the principles are not speciﬁc to the
domain of judgment / decision making. The analogy between intuition and
perception has been especially fruitful in identifying the ways in which in-
tuitive thought differs from deliberate reasoning, and the notions of accessi-
bility and dual-process analyses play a fundamental role in several domains of
social and cognitive psychology.
A general framework such as the one offered here is not a substitute for do-
main-speciﬁc concepts and theories. For one thing, general frameworks and
speciﬁc models make different ideas accessible. Novel ideas and compelling
examples are perhaps more likely to arise from thinking about problems at a
lower level of abstraction and generality. However, a broad framework can be
useful if it guides a principled search for analogies across domains, to identi-
fy common processes and to prevent overly narrow interpretations of ﬁnd-
ings.484
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